Why a “Maximalist” Approach to Ending the Russia–Ukraine Conflict May Also Be the Most Logical

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Why a “Maximalist” Approach to Ending the Russia–Ukraine Conflict May Also Be the Most Logical

It is unlikely that Vladimir Putin will voluntarily end his war of aggression against Ukraine without Ukraine's capitulation or a settlement that allows him to claim a significant victory. His unwillingness to compromise can be explained by several factors, including the enormous resources Russia has invested in the war, the consequences of defeat for his political survival, the increasing dependence of the Russian economy on military expenditure, and his ideological convictions concerning Ukraine's place in Russian history.

These factors suggest that Western efforts to negotiate an end to the war will accomplish little unless Putin's assessment of the costs and benefits of continuing the conflict changes substantially. In particular, Putin must come to believe that continuing the war poses a greater threat to his political survival than ending it. Achieving that change requires a much more comprehensive Western strategy combining military support for Ukraine, economic isolation of Russia, credible deterrence, and sustained pressure on the Kremlin.

Why Putin Is Unlikely to End the War Voluntarily

1. The Sunk-Cost Fallacy

Putin has invested enormous amounts of manpower, military equipment, and financial resources in his invasion of Ukraine. Having committed so much, he appears to believe that additional time, resources, and military offensives will eventually produce the outcome he desires. This is consistent with the sunk-cost fallacy, in which previous investments influence decisions even when the prospective benefits no longer justify the additional costs.

The battlefield evidence provides considerable reason to question the rationality of this approach. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia had achieved net territorial gains of just 73 square kilometers in 2026 as of October 21. By October 22, ISW assessed that Russia had actually lost a net 241 square kilometers of territory since September 1. Meanwhile, Ukrainian estimates indicate that Russia has suffered more than 40,000 casualties per month since July. Although casualty estimates are inherently uncertain, the territorial results remain remarkably limited relative to the resources Russia has committed.

There is also a considerable political dimension to Putin's continued commitment. He has tied his personal prestige, political legitimacy, and historical ambitions to the outcome of the war. Ending it without achieving his principal objectives would require accepting that hundreds of thousands of casualties, enormous economic costs, and years of international isolation had produced relatively little strategic benefit. Putin has cultivated an image of strength and political infallibility for more than two decades, making such an admission particularly difficult.

This creates a combination of psychological and political incentives to continue fighting. Putin may genuinely believe that Russia can eventually prevail through attrition, particularly if Western support for Ukraine diminishes. Even if he recognizes that his original objectives are becoming increasingly unattainable, he must consider the domestic political consequences of abandoning them.

2. The Stability of Putin's Rule

Putin must also consider the domestic consequences of ending the war, particularly the eventual return of hundreds of thousands of combat veterans to Russian civilian society. Many will have endured extreme hardships, witnessed serious failures of military leadership, and experienced a system in which casualties have frequently been treated as an acceptable cost of achieving limited territorial objectives. Significant numbers will return with physical disabilities, psychological injuries, and difficulties reintegrating into civilian life.

These problems could be compounded by deteriorating economic conditions, limited employment opportunities, and inadequate medical and social support. The return of large numbers of combat-experienced and potentially disillusioned men presents a significant challenge for any government, particularly one that must also manage the economic consequences of transitioning away from wartime production.

There are relevant historical precedents. Russia's disastrous involvement in the First World War contributed to the political, economic, and military conditions that brought about the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917. The Soviet war in Afghanistan also contributed to public disillusionment with the Soviet leadership and exposed weaknesses within an already troubled political system. Neither conflict was solely responsible for the collapse of its respective regime, but both contributed to broader crises of legitimacy and institutional stability.

There is no guarantee that returning veterans will become opponents of Putin. Some may remain loyal to the government, while others may embrace more radical nationalist positions. The Kremlin also possesses extensive surveillance, security, and coercive capabilities that reduce the likelihood of widespread organized opposition. Nevertheless, discontent among veterans and their families, particularly when combined with economic hardship and elite dissatisfaction, represents a potential source of political instability.

For Putin, whose political system depends heavily on personal authority, elite loyalty, and control over the security services, these risks cannot be ignored. An extended war may allow the Kremlin to postpone some of the consequences of demobilization, even as it creates additional problems that will eventually have to be addressed.

3. The Russian Economy

Russia's economy is showing increasingly serious signs of strain. Economic growth has slowed sharply, inflation remains elevated, borrowing costs are high, and the government's fiscal position has deteriorated. These pressures are occurring alongside declining oil and gas revenues, growing military expenditure, demographic difficulties, and continuing restrictions on access to Western technology and capital.

The Russian central bank's October forecasts indicate GDP growth of approximately 0.6% in 2026, with inflation expected to reach 7.1–7.6%, considerably above its 4% target. The benchmark interest rate remains at 14%, while the budget deficit is projected to reach approximately 3.2% of GDP. Oil and gas tax revenues declined by around 17% during the first nine months of 2026 compared with the corresponding period in 2025.

Russia has also become increasingly dependent on military expenditure to sustain industrial production, employment, and economic activity. Government spending on weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and associated infrastructure supports substantial portions of the manufacturing sector. However, this production contributes relatively little to the long-term productive capacity of the civilian economy. Much of what is manufactured is subsequently expended or destroyed on the battlefield.

This creates structural problems that will become increasingly difficult to manage. A substantial reduction in military expenditure could produce serious economic disruption in industries and regions that have become dependent on defense contracts. An orderly transition would require investment, industrial restructuring, and the reallocation of labor and capital at a time when Russia is already experiencing financial, demographic, and technological constraints.

None of this means that Russia is necessarily approaching economic collapse. Putin has demonstrated considerable capacity to mobilize resources, redirect industrial production, and impose economic sacrifices on the population. Russia retains substantial natural resources, an extensive industrial base, and the ability to sustain military expenditure at the expense of civilian consumption and investment.

Consequently, Western governments should not assume that Russia will simply run out of money, equipment, or soldiers. Putin's capacity to sustain the war remains considerable, even as its economic costs increase. The more important question is whether those costs can generate sufficient domestic political dissatisfaction to threaten the stability of his rule.

A combination of slowing economic growth, inflation, declining living standards, mounting casualties, and the eventual return of large numbers of dissatisfied veterans could create increasingly difficult conditions for the Kremlin. The challenge for Western policy is to ensure that these pressures become sufficiently consequential to influence Putin's decisions.

4. Putin's Desired Historical Legacy

Putin's objectives in Ukraine are also rooted in his interpretation of Russian history and his ambition to restore Russia's position as a dominant power in Eastern Europe. He has repeatedly argued that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians share a common historical identity originating in the medieval state of Kyivan Rus'. He has also questioned the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and described the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical catastrophe.

These arguments disregard the development of a distinct Ukrainian language, culture, and national identity, as well as Ukraine's internationally recognized sovereignty. Ukraine became independent in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with an overwhelming majority of participating voters supporting independence in a national referendum.

Russia subsequently recognized Ukraine's existing borders, including Crimea. Although Crimea had been transferred from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 through Soviet governmental decisions under Khrushchev's leadership, its status following Ukrainian independence was recognized by Russia. The 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine explicitly affirmed the inviolability of their existing borders and respect for each other's territorial integrity.

Historical claims concerning Kyivan Rus' or the circumstances of Crimea's transfer provide no legal justification for Russia's territorial claims. Modern sovereignty cannot be determined by selectively invoking historical associations while disregarding international agreements and the right of nations to self-determination.

Putin's interpretation of history appears central to his political objectives. His statements and actions suggest that he regards the restoration of Russian influence over Ukraine as an important part of his legacy. This ideological commitment further complicates efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement, particularly one requiring Russia to abandon its territorial ambitions.

How Can the War End?

Any proposed settlement must account for the consequences of allowing Russia to retain the benefits of its aggression. Granting Putin even a partial victory would establish a precedent that territorial conquest can succeed if an aggressor possesses sufficient military resources and is prepared to endure the associated costs.

Such an outcome would have consequences beyond Ukraine. Other revisionist and irredentist governments could conclude that military aggression remains a viable means of achieving territorial or political objectives. This would be particularly concerning in the Indo-Pacific, where the credibility of Western deterrence is already a central strategic consideration.

A premature ceasefire also presents considerable dangers. Russia possesses a much larger domestic industrial and resource base than Ukraine, and a cessation of hostilities could provide Moscow with an opportunity to rebuild depleted military formations, replenish ammunition stocks, expand weapons production, improve logistics, and incorporate lessons learned from the conflict. Russia has already demonstrated its capacity to adapt tactically and technologically during the war.

If Russia were permitted to retain occupied territory while rebuilding its military capabilities, it could eventually resume hostilities from a more advantageous position. The experience of the Minsk agreements, together with Russia's broader record of violating international commitments concerning Ukraine, provides substantial grounds for skepticism about the durability of another agreement unsupported by effective enforcement and deterrence.

Ukraine would also be able to rebuild during a ceasefire, particularly with substantial Western assistance. However, any proposal to suspend hostilities must demonstrate that Ukraine's security would improve relative to Russia's capacity for renewed aggression. A ceasefire that freezes Russian territorial gains, reduces international pressure on Moscow, and leaves Ukraine vulnerable to another invasion would be strategically dangerous.

There is also a fundamental moral dimension. Russian forces have killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians, destroyed cities and critical infrastructure, subjected civilians and prisoners to torture and sexual violence, deported Ukrainian children, and suppressed Ukrainian identity in occupied territories. The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has concluded that Russia's deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children constitute crimes against humanity.

Relinquishing Ukrainian territory would have direct consequences for the people living there. Russian occupation authorities have imposed restrictions on Ukrainian language, education, political expression, and cultural identity. Accepting permanent Russian sovereignty over these territories would leave Ukrainian citizens subject to an occupying power that has systematically violated their rights.

The question of security guarantees is equally important. Ukraine has already experienced the inadequacy of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom provided security assurances in connection with Ukraine's relinquishment of nuclear weapons. Those assurances did not prevent Russia from violating Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Any future settlement must therefore include binding security commitments comparable in credibility to NATO's Article 5, supported by concrete military capabilities, operational planning, and commitments to assist Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian aggression. Ukraine should not be expected to accept another arrangement consisting primarily of diplomatic assurances without effective enforcement mechanisms.

The objective must be to prevent Russia from benefiting strategically from its aggression while establishing conditions that make another invasion prohibitively costly.

What Should the West Do?

1. Establish Clear Strategic Objectives

Western governments should define their objectives in Ukraine explicitly and consistently. These should include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, including Crimea; the return of prisoners of war and unlawfully detained or transferred Ukrainian civilians, including deported children; reparations for the destruction inflicted on Ukraine; and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Responsible political and military leaders should face prosecution before competent international tribunals, with those subject to lawful warrants surrendered to the appropriate authorities. Accountability should remain an integral component of any comprehensive settlement.

These objectives follow from the basic principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law. Abandoning them in exchange for a settlement that legitimizes Russian territorial conquest would create serious moral and strategic consequences. Western governments should therefore maintain them as the basis of their long-term policy toward the conflict.

2. Substantially Increase Military and Economic Support for Ukraine

Military assistance to Ukraine must increase rather than diminish. Ukraine requires additional air-defense systems, interceptors, artillery ammunition, fighter aircraft, long-range precision weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, intelligence support, and other military technologies. Assistance should be sufficient to enable Ukraine to defend its territory, impose substantial costs on Russian forces, and deny Moscow the ability to achieve decisive battlefield gains.

Ukraine should also receive greater support for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets inside Russia, including military bases, ammunition depots, command facilities, logistical infrastructure, and other facilities directly supporting Russian military operations. Where oil refineries, fuel infrastructure, transportation networks, and ports make an effective contribution to Russian military action, attacks must be assessed according to the requirements of international humanitarian law, including distinction, proportionality, and military necessity.

Western governments should intensify efforts to disrupt Russia's shadow fleet through sanctions, maritime enforcement, restrictions on shipping services, and the lawful detention or seizure of vessels involved in sanctions evasion. These measures would place additional pressure on Russian energy revenues and the networks used to circumvent existing restrictions.

There should also be much closer integration between Ukrainian and Western defense industries. Ukraine has developed considerable expertise in drones, electronic warfare, battlefield communications, autonomous systems, and other technologies that have become central to modern warfare. Cooperation through joint production, research, development, and procurement would strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities while providing important technological and operational benefits to Western armed forces and manufacturers.

Civilian assistance must remain a priority. Ukraine requires substantial resources to repair energy infrastructure, restore housing, maintain public services, and protect its population from continued Russian attacks. Economic resilience and civilian protection are essential components of Ukraine's ability to sustain its defense.

3. Increase Russia's Economic and Diplomatic Isolation

Existing sanctions have imposed considerable costs on Russia, but their effectiveness has been undermined by incomplete enforcement, exemptions, and the continuing willingness of countries to purchase Russian energy and supply goods essential to its military-industrial complex.

Secondary sanctions should be imposed against countries and companies that continue to purchase Russian oil and gas or provide military equipment, dual-use technologies, financial services, and other resources sustaining Russia's war economy. Russian energy exports generate substantial government revenue, and that revenue contributes to the Kremlin's ability to finance military operations.

Countries purchasing Russian energy are therefore helping sustain the Russian state and, indirectly, its capacity to wage war. Western governments should be prepared to impose meaningful economic consequences on those continuing to provide this revenue, including major trading partners. Enforcement should apply consistently, including to Western countries that continue importing Russian energy.

Such measures would require careful coordination to mitigate disruptions to global energy supplies and prevent higher prices from offsetting the intended reduction in Russian revenues. Alternative sources of supply, coordinated financial restrictions, and tighter enforcement against intermediary companies would be important components of an effective sanctions regime.

Russia's broader international isolation should also increase. Non-essential travel by Russian citizens to Western countries should be restricted, with clearly defined exemptions for humanitarian reasons, including asylum for dissidents, family reunification, and other compelling circumstances. These restrictions would complement financial, diplomatic, and technological measures intended to increase the consequences of Russia's continued aggression.

The effectiveness of economic pressure depends on implementation. Sanctions that can be circumvented through intermediaries, third-country financial institutions, and alternative trading arrangements will have limited value. Western governments must be prepared to enforce restrictions consistently and impose substantial penalties for violations.

4. Respond More Forcefully to Russian Hybrid Warfare

Russia has conducted a sustained campaign of hostile activity against Western countries, including sabotage, arson, cyberattacks, disinformation operations, and interference directed at infrastructure and public institutions. These activities form part of a broader Russian effort to weaken Western cohesion, impose costs on countries supporting Ukraine, and undermine their willingness to confront Moscow.

NATO and its members should establish a more explicit framework for responding to these activities. Where responsibility can be attributed to the Russian state with sufficient confidence, appropriate consequences should follow, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, cyber, and, where justified under international law, military measures.

The responses should be proportionate, credible, and sufficiently predictable to strengthen deterrence. Moscow should understand that continued hostile operations against NATO members will result in progressively greater costs.

NATO must also demonstrate that it possesses the military capacity and political willingness to defeat a Russian incursion into allied territory. At the Warsaw Security Forum in October, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Alexus Grynkewich articulated an operational concept summarized as "Block, Blunt, Break."

The concept emphasizes NATO's ability to block an initial assault, blunt subsequent offensive operations, and break an adversary's capacity to sustain further attacks. Its credibility depends on adequate forward defenses, operational readiness, logistical support, reinforcement capabilities, and the political willingness to act decisively.

I believe Grynkewich's theory contains certain structural weaknesses, which I intend to examine in a separate essay on lminus1.com. Nevertheless, the broader requirement for credible deterrence remains essential, particularly as Russia continues to challenge European security through both conventional and unconventional means.

Is This Approach Maximalist?

Some will describe these objectives as maximalist. They are ambitious, but they are grounded in an assessment of Russia's strategic objectives, Putin's political incentives, and the potential consequences of allowing territorial aggression to succeed.

A settlement that permits Russia to retain the benefits of its invasion would strengthen Moscow's strategic position and could encourage further aggression against Ukraine. It would also weaken the credibility of the international rules prohibiting territorial conquest and potentially influence the calculations of other revisionist governments, including those in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it is prepared to use military force to pursue territorial and geopolitical objectives. Any settlement that leaves Ukraine vulnerable to another invasion must therefore be evaluated in terms of its likely long-term consequences for European security.

The central difficulty is that Putin appears unlikely to end the war voluntarily under present conditions. He has invested enormous resources in achieving his objectives and appears to believe that continued military pressure, Russian industrial capacity, and declining Western support will eventually produce a favorable outcome.

Western governments cannot base their strategy on the assumption that Russia will exhaust its military or economic resources. Putin possesses considerable capacity to continue fighting and has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to accept substantial casualties and economic sacrifices.

Economic pressure and military losses alone may therefore be insufficient to alter his decisions. The crucial factor is whether the continuation of the war begins to threaten Putin's own political survival.

This requires a strategy designed to increase the domestic political consequences of continuing the conflict. Sustained military pressure must deny Russia meaningful battlefield success and impose increasing personnel and equipment losses. Economic sanctions must reduce the resources available to the Kremlin while increasing the financial and social costs borne by the Russian population. These pressures must eventually affect the calculations of the political, military, economic, and security elites on whom Putin depends.

The stability of Putin's rule rests partly on his ability to maintain elite loyalty, manage competing interests, and convince influential constituencies that his continued leadership serves their interests. A prolonged war accompanied by deteriorating economic conditions, repeated military failures, mounting casualties, and growing public dissatisfaction could undermine those calculations.

The eventual reintegration of large numbers of veterans presents an additional challenge. The social and economic consequences of the war will persist long after active hostilities have ended, and the Kremlin will have to manage the expectations and grievances of individuals who have borne a disproportionate share of its costs.

These factors do not guarantee widespread opposition or regime instability. Authoritarian governments can withstand substantial economic hardship and public dissatisfaction, particularly when they possess effective coercive institutions. However, their stability also depends on maintaining the support of influential elites and preventing dissatisfaction from developing into organized political challenges.

Western policy should aim to increase the probability that continued aggression produces precisely these pressures. Putin must come to believe that prolonging the war carries an increasing risk of destabilizing his government and threatening his personal hold on power.

This calculation is central to the proposed strategy. If Putin believes that continuing the war will eventually produce victory, or that Western support for Ukraine will collapse before Russia's capacity to fight is seriously impaired, he has little incentive to compromise. That perception must be changed through sustained and credible pressure.

Western governments collectively possess economic, financial, technological, and military resources vastly exceeding those available to Russia. They have the capacity to provide Ukraine with considerably greater assistance, impose more comprehensive economic restrictions, and strengthen the military deterrence necessary to prevent further Russian aggression.

These resources must be employed as part of a coherent strategy with clearly defined objectives. The effectiveness of that strategy will depend on Western governments maintaining their commitments over time and demonstrating that Russia cannot obtain a more favorable outcome simply by continuing the war.

The long-term objective should remain the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, the protection of its sovereignty, accountability for Russian violations of international law, and credible security guarantees against future aggression. A settlement that leaves Russia positioned to resume its invasion would fail to address the underlying threat.

Ultimately, the West must change Putin's assessment of the risks associated with continuing the war. He must understand that the longer he pursues his objectives in Ukraine, the greater the military, economic, and political costs will become, and the more those costs will threaten the stability of his own government.

The fundamental requirement is to make the political cost of continuing the war greater than the political cost of ending it. Achieving that outcome requires sustained military support for Ukraine, increasingly comprehensive economic pressure on Russia, credible Western deterrence, and a strategy that makes the domestic consequences of continued aggression progressively more difficult for Putin to manage.

A so-called maximalist approach may therefore be the most logical response to the incentives sustaining Russia's war. Its success would depend on the willingness of Western governments to commit the necessary resources and maintain sufficient political unity to convince Putin that prolonging the conflict will progressively endanger his position rather than improve it.

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